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Abstract 
In a real oligopoly, firms often supply multiple products differentiated by quality in the same 
market. To examine why they do so, we consider a duopoly model in which firms can choose 
between supplying two vertically differentiated products and selling a single product in the 
same market. By deriving equilibriums for possible games and comparing their outcomes with 
each other, we explored the conditions in which firms strategically determine their product 
lines, choosing to sell between a single product and two products. The first three are the cases 
in which both firms supply both products, or they supply either homogeneous product of the 
two in the same market. The last two are those in which one firm supplies both but another 
firm does either of the two. We find that a firm producing only one product has an incentive to 
launch another product as long as it can do so. 
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Introduction 
In a real oligopolistic market, firms strategically choose their product line. That is, they 
often produce and sell multiple products vertically differentiated in a same market. For 
example, GM sells Chevrolet Cruze and GMC Sierra PU and Toyota sells Camry, Corolla 
Matrix, and Prius---the hybrid car---in the same segment of the car market. Since the quality 
of technology of each firm differs according to the viewpoint of each consumer, each 
consumer places different value on a high-quality good of each firm. As another example, 
Apple sells the iPad Mini and the larger iPad in the tablet market. Similarly, Samsung sells the 
Galaxy Note and the Galaxy Tab, both in a smaller and larger variety. 
Why does any oligopolistic firms supply only one product of them and other firms does 
multiple products in a same oligopolistic market?  A natural reason for this different behavior 
of firms is that the former firms strategically decide to meet demand of different types of 
consumers by supplying multi products differentiated in quality, but the latter firms choose to 
meet demand a type of consumers instead.  Thus, these markets may be horizontally as well 
as vertically differentiated. In such markets, there are more cases of cannibalization or launch 
of other products in the market.4 
In this paper, we explore under what conditions firms strategically choose their product 
line and sell only one product or multi products vertically differentiated in the same market by 
focusing on the consumer's assessment value of the difference of the quality and costs 
difference between firms and between vertically differentiated goods . 
In typical existing models of horizontal or vertical product differentiation, each firm 
produces only one kind of good, given exogenously, which differs from that of its rival. 
In Ellison's (2005) study, which is closely related to the present study, he analyzes a market in 
which each firm sells a high-end and low-end version of the same product. Although each firm 
produces two differentiated goods, the two goods are sold in different markets, each with 
different types of consumers.5  
In the existing literature on vertical product differentiation, the quality of goods that 
firms produce is treated as an endogenous variable. For example, in Bonanno (1986) and 
Motta (1993), firms initially choose a quality level and then compete in Cournot or Bertrand 
fashion in an oligopolistic market. However, these studies do not consider firms that sell 
multiple products in the same market that are differentiated in terms of quality (vertically). In 
dealing with cannibalization and launch of multi products in such a market, our model needs 
to allow for a multi-product firm that differs in terms of its features or characteristics. Few 
previous studies address an oligopolistic market with such firms, although Johnson and Myatt 
(2003) are a notable exception.6 
                                                   
4Actually, many reports suggest that the iPad Mini is cannibalizing sales of the larger iPad. See, for example, Seward (2013). 
According to a web business news site, ‘With a launch of 10.1-inch Galaxy Note (Samsung’s latest tablet) it [Samsung] would 
most likely to [sic] cannibalize sales of the existing 10.1-inch Tablet’ (Samsung’s Brand Cannibalization, 
http://www.indianprice.com/mobiles/articles/15-samsungs-brand-cannibalization.html).  
 
5His model combines vertical (two distinct qualities) and horizontal (two firms located at distinct points in a linear city) 
differentiation. 
 
6For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a duopoly model. 
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According to Johnson and Myatt (2003), firms that sell multiple quality-differentiated 
products frequently change their product lines when a competitor enters the market. They 
explain the common strategies of using fighting brands and pruning product lines. That is, they 
endogenize not only the quality level of each good, but also the number of goods that each 
firm supplies in the market. By choosing strategically quality and outputs of multiple products 
differentiated in quality, they suggest that firms can identify different segments of the market 
demand. 
For the purpose of our analysis, i.e. characterization of firms' cannibalization and launch 
of multi products, we consider cases in which both the quality level and the number of 
differentiated goods supplied by each firm are given, unlike in preceding studies. In addition, 
we do not consider new entries to the market in our model. In our setting, at first both firms 
produce and supply two kinds of vertically differentiated goods in a market and derive 
equilibrium. Then, we consider the other four cases in which both firms sell only product ,H  
or product L , one of two firms sells both products and another firm sells only product H  or 
product L  and derive four equilibria in these cases. By comparing equilibriums one the other 
in five cases including first case, we explore under what conditions firms strategically choose 
their product line and sell only one product or multi products vertically differentiated in the 
same market. 
Notably, this study's results are related to those in the marketing literature on product 
segmentation and the distribution strategy of products. For example, Calzada and Valletti 
(2012) study a model of film distribution and consumption. They consider a film studio that 
can release two versions of one film--one in theatres and the others as a video-- although they 
do not consider oligopolistic competition between film studios. In their model, a film studio 
decides on its versioning and sequencing strategy. The former involves simultaneous release 
of the versions, and the latter, sequential release. They show that the optimal strategy of the 
studio is to introduce versioning if their goods are not close substitutes for each other. This 
versioning and sequencing in their model respectively correspond to a simultaneous and 
sequential supply (launch) of high- and low-quality goods to the same market in our model. It 
implies the big difference of the quality of the two differentiated of goods in our model that 
two goods are not too substitute in their model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. 
In section 3, at first we derive a duopoly equilibrium with two vertically differentiated 
products in a market. Furthermore, we also derive duopoly equilibria in other four cases in 
which both firms sell only product ,H  or product L , one of two firms sells both products 
and another firm sells only product H  or product L . In section 4, we compare equilibria 
one the other in five case and examine firms' strategic choice of product line. Finally, section 5 
concludes the paper and offers suggestions for possible future research. 
 
The Model 
In this section, at first, we present our basic model. Then, we consider the case in which one 
firm can alter its product lines in response to competition and derive equilibriums in three 
cases. That is, the first case is the one in which each of two firms supplies vertically 
differentiated two products, the second is the one in which Suppose that there are two firms, 
( 2,1i  ), each producing two goods (good H  and good L ) that differ in terms of quality, 
where  2,1   imply firm 1 and firm 2 in the duopoly case, respectively. Let HV  and LV  
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denote the quality level of the two goods. Then, the maximum amount consumers are willing 
to pay for each good is assumed to be 0 LH VV . Further, we assume LH VV )1(  , 
where   represents the difference in quality between the two goods, and we normalize the 
quality of the low-quality good as  1LV , for simplicity. Good k   LH , ) is assumed to 
be homogeneous for any consumer. Moreover, suppose that each firm has constant returns to 
scale and that  LjLiLiH cccc  , where ikc  is firm i  's marginal and average cost of 
good k . This implies that a high-quality good incurs a higher cost of production than a 
low-quality good.7 Without loss of generality, we also assume that  0Lc .   
Under these assumptions, each firm's profit is defined in the following manner:  
,2,1)(  iqpqcp iLiLiHiHiHi                     (1) 
where ikp  is the price of goods k  sold by firm i , and ikq  is the firm's output. Each firm 
chooses the quantity to supply that maximizes this profit function in Cournot fashion. 
Next, we describe the consumers' behavior in our model. 
Following the standard specification in the literature, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985), 
we assume that there is a continuum of consumers characterized by a taste parameter,  , 
which is uniformly distributed between  0  and )0(r , with density 1. We further assume 
that a consumer of type  ],,0[ r  for r  0, obtains a net surplus from one unit of good 
k  from firm i  at price ikp .  Thus, the utility (net benefit) of consumer   who buys good 
k  ( LH , ) from firm i  ( 2,1 ) is given by  
.,2,1,)( LHkipVU ikkik                       (2) 
Each consumer decides to buy either nothing or one unit of good k  from firm i  to 
maximize his/her surplus. 
Under some regular conditions, we can derive the following inverse demand functions:8  




.
))(1(
LHL
LHH
QQrp
QQrp 
                              (3) 
                            
 
Derivation of an Equilibrium 
In this section, we firstly consider the duopoly in which each firm supplies both of vertically 
differentiated two products in the same market as a bench mark. Then, we consider the case 
when one of firms can alter its product lines in response to competition. For example, suppose 
that a firm (say, firm i ) can choose to produce both goods or one type of good but another 
                                                   
7For the symmetric costs version of our analysis, see Kitamura and  Shinkai (2013) in details. 
 
8 See the detailed discussion in Kitamura and Shinkai (2014) for the derivation of this inverse demand function under the 
following assumptions. First, the consumer, )0(],,(ˆ  rri , is indifferent between the two goods of the same firm. 
Second, the consumer, ,2,1, iiL  is always indifferent between purchasing good L and purchasing nothing in a 
duopoly. Finally, the net surplus of consumer   must be the same regardless of whether the good is produced by firm 1 or 
firm 2 as long as the two firms produce goods of the same quality   and have positive sales in the duopoly. 
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firm (firm j ) produces both goods in oligopoly. One real example of this situation is the fact 
observed in the Japanese smart phone industry---Softbank, which is a Japanese mobile service 
provider, sells both android smart phones and iPhones.9 On the other hand, KDDI---also a 
Japanese mobile service provider---sold only android smart phones. However, in 2011, KDDI 
determined to sell the iPhone as well. Is it favorable for KDDI to sell both android smart 
phones and the iPhone? In the real economy, there are several examples of the above 
mentioned models. 
We explore under what conditions firms strategically choose their product line and sell 
only one product or multi products vertically differentiated in the same market. Starting the 
case in which each firm supplies both goods into the market, we consider the following five 
situations. To save the space in the paper, we omit derivation of outputs and profits of firms 
and prices of goods in the equilibriums of these five case games and we summarize these in 
Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
 Case a 
In this case, both firms produce both goods. This situation has already been considered in 
Kitamura and Shinkai (2014), and we use it's all assumptions as benchmark of our model. 
Thus, the inverse demand functions are obtained in the following manner:  




.
))(1(
LHL
LHH
QQrp
QQrp 
                            (4) 
Then, firm i  chooses its outputs of each product so as to maximize its profit (1). 
For the equilibrium outputs of the goods,  iHq   and  

iLq   to be positive, from Table 1 we 
assume that 
.,2,1,
2
12 jijiccand
cc
r jHiH
jHiH             (5) 
 
 Case b 
In this case, firm i  produces only good H and firm j  supplies both goods in the market. 
Then, by setting  jLL qQ   in (4), the inverse demands of two goods can be rewritten as  

 

.,
))(1(
jiqQrp
qQrp
jLHL
jLHH   
Then, the profit of each firm is rewritten from (1) as  




.2,1,,)(
)(
jijiqpqcp
qcp
jLLjHjHHj
iHiHHi


            (6) 
Then, each firm chooses its outputs of each product so as to maximize its profit (6). 
For the equilibrium outputs of the goods, iHq  and 

jHq  to be positive, from Table 1 we 
                                                   
9Geekbench indicates quality differences between the iPhone and Android smartphones. 
See http://browser.primatelabs.com/geekbench2/1030202 for the iPhone and 
 http://browser.primatelabs.com/android-benchmarks for Android smartphones. 
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assume that 
 
)1(2
3)2(2



 jHiHjHiH ccccr                          (7) 
 
 Case c 
In this case, firm i  produces only good L . Therefore by setting HQ jHq  in (4), the 
inverse demands of two goods are rewritten as  
 




LjHL
LjHH
Qqrp
Qqrp ))(1( 
                         (8) 
The profit of each firm is rewritten from (1) as  




.2,1,,)( jijiqpqcp
qp
jLLjHjHHj
iLLi


         (9) 
   
Each firm chooses its outputs of each product so as to maximize its profit (9). 
For the equilibrium outputs of the goods, ciHq  and 
c
jHq  to be positive from Table 1, we see 
that the inequality 
r
c
r jH
3
1                                    (10) 
holds. 
 
 Case d 
In this case, both firms produce only product H . So by setting 0LQ  in (4), the inverse 
demands of two goods are presented from as 
.))(1( HH Qrp                              (11) 
So from (1) the profit of each firm is given by 
.2,1,)))(1(()(  iqcQrqcp iHiHHiHiHHi            (12) 
Each firm chooses its outputs of each product so as to maximize its profit (profit of case d). 
For the positivity of equilibrium output, we see from Table1 that 
.2,1)(,,
1
2 
 ijiccr jHiH                       (13) 
 Case e 
In this case, both firms produce only product L . Hence by setting  0HQ  in (4), the 
inverse demands of two goods can be rewritten as 
pL  r − QL.
 
 
Then, from (1) the profit of each firm is 
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iL ≡ pLqiL  r − QLqiL.
 
To maximize its profit give above, each firm chooses its outputs of each product. 
 
[Insert here Table 1] 
 
 
Strategic Choice of Product Line 
In this section, we compare five equilibriums one the other and explore how each firm 
strategically chooses its product line and supply only one product or both ones in a same 
market. By comparison case c and case e, we can obtain the conditions under which firm j  
in case e expands its product line and supplies not only product L  but also H  in the same 
market thus moves to case c, and we obtain the following proposition. For the proof of the 
proposition, see Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1  Suppose that each firm supplies only product L  (case e).  If the evaluation 
of the value of the one unit difference of high and low quality product for the consumer with 
the highest preference is higher than firm j 's unit cost of high quality product, i.e. 
/jHcr   ( /jHcr  ), then firm j  supplies both quality products (only product L ) in the 
same market and the state of the market moves to case c (remains case e). 
 
The intuition for the proposition is obvious. If the maximal value obtained for the consumer 
with the highest preference from replacing a unit consumption of product H  with that of 
product L is larger than the unit cost of the unit cost of product H  of firm j , then the 
demand for product H  of firm j  is at least positive and the maximum margin for a unit of 
product H  is positive and a launch of product H  into the market is better off for firm j  
and the state moves from case e to case c. But conversely, the maximum margin for a unit of 
product H  is negative, i.e. jHcr  , then firm j  cannibalizes the product H  and 
supplies only product L  into the same market. 
 
Next, we compare case b with case d and we explore the conditions under which firm j  in 
case d supplies not only product L but also H  in the same market, thus moves to case b. For 
the proof of the proposition, see Appendix. 
 
[Insert here Table 2] 
 
Proposition 2 Suppose that each firm supplies only product H  (case d).  If the evaluation 
of the value of the one unit of high quality product for the consumer with the highest 
preference is higher than firm i  's substantial unit cost of high quality product H , which is 
compensated by its cost advantage over firm j , i.e. )1(  jHiH ccr  2 , then firm j  
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supplies both quality products in the same market. 
 
The intuition for the proposition is interesting. The condition for firm j  to supply both 
quality products given in the proposition can be rewritten into 
)()2()1( iHjHiHjHiH cccccr   . The left hand side of this inequality is the evaluation 
for the product H  of the consumer with the highest preference, and )( iHjH cc   in the right 
hand side of it can be interpreted as how much does have firm j  disadvantage in unit cost of 
high quality product compared to firm i . Note that both firms supply only high quality 
product in case d. Thus, as the evaluation for the product H  of the consumer with the highest 
preference is higher, or as firm j  's cost disadvantage for the product H   is higher, the 
more this inequality facilitates to hold. So firm j  starts to produce the output of product L  
with no cost and cannibalizes product H  with own cost disadvantage! 
Finally we examine under which conditions firm i  in case b or c expands its product line and 
supplies not only one product but also another in the same market and moves to case a when 
its rival firm j  produces and sell both products H  and L . 
 
Proposition 3 When firm i  chooses to expand its product line or supply only one type of 
goods, while firm j  sells both goods, then  firm i has an incentive to produce both goods. 
 
Proof: From the third column in Table 2, 
ia∗ − ib∗  191   2ciH − cjH
2  0,
 
and  
ia∗ − ic∗  19 r − 2ciH − cjH2  0,
 
 
where both of inequalities in the above hold from positive output condition in case a, (5).               
 
To understand the intuition of this proposition, we consider the increments of firm i  's profit 
of each good from case (b) to case (a) and from case (c) to case (a). For this, we define nik  
and nk  as 
,,,,,2,1,)( LHkcbniqcp nkik
n
k
n
ik                      (14) 
and  
,,,,,2,1, LHkcbninik
a
ik
n
k                        (15) 
respectively. 
 
Then, we can immediately obtain each incremental quantity of profits: 
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











.0)(
,0
,0
,0
)2(
9
9
)2)(2)1((
9
)2(
)1(9
)2)1)((2(










jHiH
jHiHjHiH
jHiH
jHiHjHiH
ccrc
L
crccrc
H
ccrb
L
ccrccb
H
r
 
 
And we can show that  

 

.0
0
c
L
c
H
b
L
b
H


                             (16) 
Moreover, it is easy to see that  
.  cLaLbHaH ppandpp  
  
From the above, we reach following intuition to proposition 3: firm i  makes a profit by 
expand its product line and the profit is larger than it of the baseline product because selling 
two products gives him the positive effects of both price and quantity on profit, while it results 
in the negative effect of only quantity of original good. Equation (16) implies the positive 
effects always dominate the negative effect on firm i  's profit. Thus, firm i  supply two 
differentiated goods. 
In the Japanese smart phone industry, Proposition 3 shows that the introduction of the 
iPhone is very natural because KDDI makes a profit by selling it. 
It is interesting that firm i  determines to compete in two goods to maximize its profit (that is, 
both firms supply two differentiated goods). Thus, in the future, it is possible that both 
Softbank and KDDI sell both goods so long as they can supply high quality product H  in 
Japan. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we considered a duopoly model in which two firms choose cannibalization 
or launch of other products that are differentiated as well as vertically in the same market. We 
explored under what conditions firms strategically choose their product lines and sell only one 
product or two products in the market. 
At first, we derived duopoly equilibrium in which each firm sells two vertically 
differentiated products H and L in a same market. Next, we also derived equilibriums in the 
other four cases; the first two cases in which both firms sell only homogeneous product H or 
product L , the next two in which one of the firms sells both products but another firm sells 
only product H or product L . 
Then, starting from the case in which both firms only product L in a duopolistic market, we 
explored the condition under which a firm whether or not expands its product line and 
launches product H in the same market provided that its rival firm remains to sell only 
product L . In consequent, we showed that if the evaluation of the value of the one unit 
difference of high quality product for the consumer with the highest preference is higher than 
it own firm's unit cost of high quality product, then the firm supplies both quality products in 
the same market.  
Next, when both firms only product H  in a duopolistic market, we explored the 
condition under which a firm whether or not expands its product line and launches product L  
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in the same market provided that its rival firm remains to sell only product H . Then, we show 
that if the evaluation of the value of the one unit of high quality product for the consumer with 
the highest preference is higher than its rival firm's  substantial unit cost of high quality 
product H , which is compensated by its cost advantage over own firm  )( iHjHiH ccc   , 
then the firm supplies both quality products in the same market. 
Finally, starting from the case in which one of the firms sells both products but another firm 
sells only product H or product L , we examined the condition under which a firm whether 
or not expands its product line and launches another product in the same market provided that 
its rival firm remains to sell both products. Consequently, we showed that the firm always has 
an incentive to expand its product line and launch another good.  
Extensions to this study in future research are possible. For example, it would be useful to 
analyze a case in which each firm can choose its quality level as well as the number of goods 
it produces. In addition, in this study, we do not consider a market with network externality, 
which would be worth studying if we consider a market such as smart phone industry or the 
tablet PC industry described in section 2. Indeed, we are investigating such a market in 
another study.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:From the third column in Table 2, 
 when case c can occur, 
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holds, since  rr jHc 31    in the aquarium in case c from (10). If  jHcr   , then firm  j   
never supplies high quality product  H   and supplies only product  L  , i.e.  0jHq   
and  3/rejLq   . Hence  ,0)(  ejcj    the result follows.    
 
Proof of Proposition 2: From the third column in Table 2, we have 
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(A1) 
Looking 22 )957(408 jHiHjHiH cccc    upon as a quadratic function of iHc  in the 
square brackets of the last line and denoting its discriminant by D , since the coefficient of 
2
iHc  is negative i.e.  08    and 
,0)18(7
4
2  jHcD   
We see that  0)957(408 22  jHiHjHiH cccc   and the right-hand side of the last 
inequality (A1), thus we have    0)957(408 22)1(8 1  jHiHjHiHc ccccjH  . So taking 
this into consideration with the fact that 0r  and (13) when  12 jHiH ccr  holds, we see that 
0  djbj   and the case b is always better off for firm j  than the case d. If   12 jHiH ccr   
holds, then firm i  never supplies product H  from (13) and it implies that even case d 
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cannot occur, so the difference    djbj   itself is meaningless.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Inverse Demand Equilibrium outputs: qiH∗ , qiL∗  
a pH 1  r − QH − QL,
pL r − QH−QL.  
qiH
∗  13 r −
2ciH−cjH
 and
qiL
∗  2ciH−cjH3 , i, j  1,2, i ≠ j.  
b pH 1  r − QH − qjL,
pL r − QH−qjL, i ≠ j.  
qiH
b∗≡ qiH∗  13 r −
2ciH−cjH
1 , qiL
b∗  0,
qjH
b∗≡ qjH∗  13 r −
22ciH−cjH3cjH
21 ,
qjL
b∗≡ qjL∗ 
cjH
2 , j  1,2.
c pH 1  r − qjH − QL,
pL r − qjH−QL.  
qiL
c∗≡ qiL∗  r3 , qiHc∗  0,
qjH
c∗≡ qjH∗  12 r −
cjH
 ,
qjL
c∗≡ qjL∗  12 
cjH
 − r3 .  
d pH 1  r − QH  qiHd∗ 13 r −
2ciH−cjH
1 , i, j≠ i  1,2 
e pL r − QL  qiLe∗ 13 r, i  1,2
 
Table 1 Inverse Demand and Equilibrium outputs of firms in each case 
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Case pH∗ , pL∗  i∗,j∗  
a pHa∗  1rciHcjH3
pLa∗  13 r jiji
jHiHjHiH ccrccra
i

 
,2,1,
,9
)2()2(2)1( 22

  
b pHb∗  13 1  r  ciHcjH
pLb∗  13 r −
cjH
21  ciH1
 ib∗ 19 1  r −
2ciH−cjH
1 2 , i, j  1,2 i ≠ j
 jb∗ 191 1  r  ciH−2cjH2
1
4 cjH
2
c pHc∗  12 
32
3 r cjH
pLc∗  13 r  
 ic∗ r
2
9 , i  1,2
 jc∗ 12 
94
18 r
2−rcjH 12 cjH2   
d pHd∗  13 1  r 
cjH−ciH
1    id∗ 19 1  r22cjH − 3ciH r
 11 cjH−4ciH2ciH−cjH, i, j  1,2  
e pLc∗  13 r  ie∗ 19 r2 , i  1,2
 
Table 2 Equilibrium prices and profit of each firm in each case 
 
